Improving the accuracy of caller line identity

Jill Faure and Tim Gilfedder

The majority of UK adults have been exposed to some form of suspicious call or messaging

Texts are most common and the prevalence of suspicious calls to mobiles and landline is similar


8 in 10 UK adults

have received some form of suspicious messaging over the past three months*

78%
Any type of suspicious call or message

28%
Recorded message on mobile

21%
Live voice call on mobile

18%
Recorded message on landline

19%
Live voice call on landline

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The majority of landline and mobile users with caller display use it at least sometimes to decide whether to answer calls

When your landline rings, how often do you decide whether to answer by looking at the number on the handset?

91%

Landline

- 45%
- 34%
- 13%
- 6%
- 3%

When your mobile rings, how often do you decide whether to answer by looking at the number on the handset?

93%

Mobile

- 52%
- 30%
- 10%
- 4%
- 2%
- 1%

- Always
- Usually
- Sometimes
- Rarely
- Never
- Don't know

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But misuse of CLI can lead to consumer harm

Scammers have spoofed banks, Government departments etc to intentionally mislead the recipient of the call about who is calling them.

Barclays customer received 'call out of the blue' costing her £83,000 – how to avoid scams

BARCLAYS has offered guidance on how Britons can handle suspicious calls after a customer lost £83,000 to scammers, thinking they were talking to an employee from the bank.

Scammers using HMCTS telephone numbers

HMCTS are aware of a telephone scam impacting members of the public.

From: **HM Courts & Tribunals Service**
Published 30 September 2021

Criminals are using HMCTS telephone numbers as a way to target the public by convincing them to hand over money and personal information such as national insurance numbers.

The calls impersonate HMCTS and may ask the caller to 'press 1' in order to speak with an advisor about unpaid fines or police warrants.

NICC have played a critical role in provision of caller line information

ND1016
(first published 2004)

- Rules for calls interconnecting between UK CPs so that CLI data can be exchanged accurately, setting out the responsibilities of the call originator, CPs involved in the transmission of the call and the provision of this information to end devices.

ND1439
(first published 2015)

- Guidance for CPs using SIP on how to apply ND1016 in SIP networks, for example use of the P-AID header and From header to signal a Network Number and a Presentation Number.

ND1447
(first published 2021)

- Guidance for CPs receiving calls from non-UK interconnect about the exceptions for blocking of calls that use UK CLI as a Network Number, e.g. permitting use of +447, calls to UK MSRN ranges and segmenting UK originated calls into a route that should not be blocked.

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Ofcom's powers in relation to scams and nuisance calls

Rules on the allocation and use of telephone numbers

➤ Where telephone numbers or services are misused we can withdraw number allocations

GC C6 and the CLI Guidance

➤ Requiring the provision of accurate CLI data and to block calls with invalid and non-dialable numbers

Enforcement

➤ We can take enforcement action where a person has persistently misused an electronic communications network or service

Changes to GC C6

Today, we have published our statement with our decision for changes to GC C6 and the CLI Guidance, to improve what CPs should be doing to improve the quality of the CLI information provided with calls.

Current GC C6.6	Modified GC C6.6
Where technically feasible, **Regulated Providers** must: a) take all reasonable steps to identify calls, other than calls to **Emergency Organisations**, in relation to which invalid or non-dialable CLI Data is provided; and b) prevent those calls from being connected to the called party, where such calls are identified.	Where technically feasible, **Regulated Providers** must: a) take all reasonable steps to identify calls, other than calls to **Emergency Organisations**, in relation to which the **CLI Data** provided ==is invalid, does not uniquely identify the caller, or does not contain a Telephone Number that is dialable==; and b) prevent those calls from being connected to the called party, where such calls are identified.

Changes to the CLI Guidance

We have also made a number of changes to the CLI Guidance

- Clarifying that the format of a CLI should be a 10- or 11-digit number;

- Making use of information that identifies numbers which should not be used as CLI, such as Ofcom's numbering allocation information and the Do Not Originate (DNO) list;

- Identifying calls originating abroad that do not have valid CLI and blocking them;

- Identifying and blocking calls from abroad spoofing UK CLI;

- Prohibiting the use of 09 non-geographic numbers as CLI; and

- Including a reference to Display Name information

There is more to consider on CLI and related issues

- Some areas we will need to work closely with NICC:

  - Further examination of less common, but important scenarios and how to accommodate them

    - E.g. satellite calls from aircraft

  - Use of UK CLI as a Presentation Number for calls from outside the UK

  - Consideration of potential guidance on exchange of Display Name information

  - Exploring the need for different Presentation Number types in the CLI guidance

- And others for which Ofcom will take the lead on (at least initially)

  - CLI authentication – should more be done to give confidence in telephone numbers?

  - Thinking about further work to counter scam texts